Bail-in under the Bank recovery and resolution Directive (BRRD): mechanism and imapct on financial stability

Balkanov Hristina (Pravni fakultet, Beograd), balkanovhristina1@gmail.com

This research analyses the implementation of the bail‐in mechanism under the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) as an alternative to the traditional bail‐out approach. The main objective is to assess the impact of this regulatory framework on financial stability, market discipline, and public finances. Through a comparative analysis, the paper explains that bail‐in reduces the fiscal burden on the state and encourages more responsible risk management. However, in practice, it raises issues of legal certainty, equal treatment of creditors, and potential erosion of trust in the banking sector. The case studies of Cyprus, Italy, and Spain illustrate the institutional and legal challenges of implementing bail‐in in real‐world scenarios, including disproportionate impacts on specific categories of depositors and investors, as well as the complexity of judicial review of authorities’ decisions. Special attention is given to the transposition of the BRRD into Serbian legislation and the role of the National Bank of Serbia in implementing these new instruments. The conclusion emphasises that bail‐in is not a universally applicable model and that its effectiveness depends on institutional maturity, legal transparency, and the capacity of supervisory authorities. In Serbia’s context, further capacity building and alignment with European standards are necessary to ensure the effective and fair resolution of banks during crises.

Keywords: financial stability, bank resolution, bail‐in, bail‐out, BRRD Directive